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R. G. Frey, Interests and Rights: The Case Against Animals
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press), 1980
{A· Second Opi n ion}
I n this review I will discuss an
aspect of Frey's book not considered
in Edward Johnson's
review (E&A
11/1) or in the dialogue it prompted
(Frey's reply E&A 11/4; Johnson's
reply E&A 111/1). This aspect, which
is presented primarily in Frey's final
chapter, is whether the capacity to
feel pain is a necessary condition for
having interests. Frey's primary tar
get in this regard is Peter Singer,
who in Animal Liberation holds that
animals' interests arise from their
capacity to feel pain, and that this
capacity is a prerequisite for having
any interests at all. Frey, of cou rse,
does not deny animals' capacity to feel
pain; rather, he argues that this
capacity is not a prerequisite for hav
i ng interests.

Frey has shown,
believe, by
these examples, that the capacity
presently to feel physical pain is not
a
necessary condition for
having
interests.
This,
however,
is an
excessively narrow understanding of
"pain", since mental as well as physi
cal discomfort can .constitute pain, and
potential future pain should be taken
into account. I submit that, although
the capacity presently to feel physical
pain is not a necessary condition for
having interests, a case may be made
that the capacity to experience mental
or physical suffering, in the present
or the future, is a prerequisite to
having interests.
For conven ience, I
will refer to th is expanded u nder
standing of the capacity to experience
pain as the capacity to suffer.

The capacity to feel pain, Frey
alleges, is not necessary for having
interests because individuals can have
interests and lack this capacity. Frey
cites four examples: (1) his friend,
who receiVed severe and extensive
head, spinal and nervous injuries and
is conscious although unable to feel
pain; (2)
Karen Quinlan, who is
comatose; (3) human fetuses; and (4)
unconceived
persons.
Among
the
interests Frey suggests these subjects
have are, in the case of his inju red
friend, an interest in the care of him
self and his family; in the case of
Karen Quinlan, an interest in her care
and her privacy; and, in the case of
human fetuses and unconceived per
sons, an interest in the present gen
eration's not polluting the environment
or indiscriminately using up natural
resources.
In addition, fetuses and
unconceived persons may have inter
ests as the beneficia ries of trust
funds, and fetuses have an interest in
nourishment.

Frey's injured friend
has this
capacity; he may experience mental
distress, for example, if he or his
family is not cared for.
Fetuses and
unconceived persons also have this
capacity; they will be affected in the
future (when and if they are born) if
the present generation excessively
pollutes the earth or uses up its nat
ural
resources.
Thus,
without
asserting an interest in being born on
behalf of either fetuses or uncon
ceived persons, we can speak mean
ingfully of their having interests.
Frey's fourth subject who cannot
feel pain, Karen Quinlan, I assume for
the sake of argument to be totally and
permanently unable to experience any
physical or mental discomfort.
On
this assumption, she lacks the capac
ity to suffer, even in the broad sense
defined above.
From this I conclude
that she has no more interests than,
to be blunt, a dead person.
(If on
the other hand, there is a chance that
in the future she may again be
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sentient, then she has generally the
same interests as a sleeping person.)
Frey considers the suggestion that
Karen Quinlan has no interests to be
"bizarre", but to face the matter can
candidly, if you, the reader, as con
conscious as you a re now, were forced to
choose between death on a certain
date or on that date bei ng rendered
irreversibly comatose for an indefinite
period to be followed immediately by
death, would you consider it a mean
meaningfu I choice?
The capacity to suffer, defined to
include mental and physical discom
discomfort, also furnishes a firmer footing
for animals' interests than does the
more limited capacity to feel pain.
This is because much of the suffering
of animals in factory fa rms and labo
laboratories is mental as well as physical.
In addition, the capacity to suffer
takes in fetuses and the unconceived
of species other than humans, who
also have a future stake in our not
excessively polluting theenvi ronment
or exhausting the supply of natural
resou rces.
I have argued that a case may be
made that the capacity to suffer is a
necessary condition for having inter
interests.
I n fact, I have not made such
a case, and, for two reasons, I have
no interest in making one.
It is evi
evident that I have not proven that the
capacity to suffer is a necessary con
condition for having interests, since I
have not attempted to show that sub
subjects that can not suffer cannot have
interests.
Plants
and
inanimate
objects presumably cannot suffer, and
it may well be that they therefore
cannot have interests, but if there is
some basis other than the capacity to
suffer upon which they can be shown
to have interests, then the case for
animals' interests would be unaffected.
That is the fi rst reason why I have
no interest in proving that the capac
capacity to suffer is a prerequisite to hav-
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ing interests. (Here, incidentally, we
should distinguish between the two
forms of having an interest exempli
exemplified in the sentences "Good health is
in John's interest" and "John takes an
interest in good health." Even plants
and inanimate objects arguably can
have interests in the former sense,
but only people (generally), and per
perhaps an imals (generally), can have
interests in the latter sense.
Frey,
on this point, seems to have a double
standard.
He denies that animals
have interests in the sense of taking
an interest, and therefore concludes
that their interests are on a par with
those of tractors. Yet he admits that
Karen Quinlan cannot take an interest
in anything, but clearly believes that
she has more vital interests than do
tractors. )
The second reason that I have no
interest in attempting to prove that
the capacity to suffer is a necessary
condition for having interests is that
to do so would not by itself prove
that animals have interests.
To do
this I would have to prove that the
capacity to suffer (or some other
quality animals possess) is a sufficient
condition for having interests.
To
prove this Frey says one must prove
that pain is intrinsically evil, and
challenges advocates of animals' inter
interests to do so.
But this point was
covered by Edward Johnson's com
comments on Frey's book.
In conclusion,
believe
have
shown that a strong case may be made
that the capacity to suffer physical or
mental harm in the· present or the
futu re is a necessary condition for
having interests, but that the more
important question is whether it is a
sufficient condition.
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